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Abstract This paper considers the problem of allocating an object between two play-
ers in an environment with one sided asymmetric information when their reservation
payoffs depend on the type of the informed player, causing the reservation payoff of
the uninformed player to be unobservable to her. Inefficiency arises naturally in this
setting and can be characterized by a simple condition on the reservation payoffs that
is necessary and sufficient. I derive the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an implementable allocation that at least weakly dominates the reservation
payoffs. Under a mild assumption on the distribution of types, I characterize the sur-
plus maximizing mechanism in the second best setting. I argue that the model applies
to an environment where property rights over the object are not well defined and are
subject to costly enforcement. In such cases, type dependent reservation payoffs arise
naturally as the uninformed player’s expectation from the enforcement process. The
model can explain why the best ways of avoiding costly dispute resolution, such as
arbitration as a way of avoiding litigation, typically involve a degree of inefficiency.
JEL Classification D82 · D74 · D61
1 Introduction
This paper considers the problem of efficiently allocating an object between two
players in an environment where it is clear which of the two values the object more.
I present a model where the valuation of one of the two players is observable and
known to be higher than that of the other. When the reservation payoff of one of the
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two players is zero, like in the buyer-seller case (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983), this
problem is trivial as the object can be allocated to the player with the higher valuation,
in exchange for a transfer that satisfies the IR constraint of the other player. However,
this first best solution may not be implementable under budget balance even with one-
sided private information when the reservation payoffs of the two players depend on
the type of the player who observes his type privately. Such type dependence in the
reservation payoffs arises naturally in settings with incomplete property rights where
partial claims over an object lead to the type of both players influencing what each
receives in the event the inefficient reservation payoffs are triggered.1 I show that the
first best solution is implementable under budget balance if and only if the reservations
payoffs satisfy a simple condition (Lemma 1).
This paper introduces a new and potentially interesting mechanism design prob-
lem and its solution. Taking the dependence of reservation payoffs on the type of the
informed player as exogenous, the main results of this paper derive the surplus max-
imizing mechanism when the first best is not implementable (Proposition 2) and the
necessary and sufficient condition for its existence (Lemma 2). The technical diffi-
culty in characterizing the surplus maximizing mechanism comes from the fact that the
reservation payoffs depend on the type that is not publicly observed. Consequently, in
contrast to the standard mechanism design problem where the IR constraint typically
binds for only one type, in this case both the incentive and IR constraints may bind at
several sub intervals of the type space.
It is possible to cast the inefficiency result of this model in the Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) framework. I depart from the standard Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) framework in the following ways: First, unlike, Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983), there is only one-sided private information. Second, there is no uncertainty
about which of the two players values the object more. Third, the distribution of val-
uation of the player with private valuation is left unspecified and need not be continu-
ous. However in a stronger assumption relative to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983),
I assume that the reservation payoffs depend on the privately observed type. In the
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) world since property rights are well defined, the
seller walks away with an undisputed ownership over the object in case there is no
trade. Consequently the reservation payoff of the seller is simply her valuation and
the reservation payoff of the buyer is zero. This is in contrast to the application in
Sect. 4 where the reservation payoffs for both players depend on their opponent’s type
through the choice of equilibrium effort in a game that determines their property rights
over the object.2
Following this interpretation, the inefficiency result presented here indicates that
when reservation payoffs represent the payoffs from conflict, mechanisms that help
players avoid conflict may not be fully efficient. An example of this is arbitration as a
mechanism to avoid litigation. Although the costs of arbitration are significantly lower
than litigation, parties to arbitration typically hire lawyers to argue their case, and this
1 An application of this model on these lines is presented in Sect. 4.
2 For a somewhat different treatment of incomplete property rights see Schmitz (2001) where the lack of
property rights worsens the reservation payoffs leading to full efficiency in the Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) framework.
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is costly for both parties. The results rationalize the phenomenon of dispute resolution
mechanisms such as arbitration involving a smaller but positive degree of inefficiency.
The inefficiency that arises from games such as a contest under complete infor-
mation, disappears as soon as parties are allowed to meet each other costlessly at a
stage prior to the contest as this leads to efficient bargaining that avoids the costs of the
contest.3 On the other hand inefficiencies arising in the problem of allocating an object
disappear when it is clear who values the object more, even when the exact valuations
are unobservable (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983). This paper attempts to incorporate
both these elements into one model. I consider the case when the reservation payoffs
arise in a way that allows the informed player’s type to enter the reservation payoff
of the uninformed player. This induces a change in the character of the informational
asymmetry from private values to an environment similar to interdependent prefer-
ences. Consequently the inefficiency that arises here is neither subsumed by our usual
understanding of the inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetry with private
values nor from surplus losses associated with inefficient games such as a contest.
This paper is related to the growing literature on mechanism design when the reser-
vation payoff of a player is type dependent. Jehiel et al. (1996) analyze a mechanism
design problem when the final payoffs of the players are not solely determined by
whether or not they are allocated the good. Figueroa and Skreta (2009) study this
problem further in the context of a revenue maximizing auction. In these settings the
optimal mechanism must take into account the externalities arising from any alloca-
tion. In contrast to these papers, in my setting, the type dependence of the reservation
payoffs does not arise as a result of externalities of the allocation, and indeed there
is common knowledge about what the first best is—It is always optimal to allocate
the object to the uninformed player regardless of the type of the informed player. The
inefficiency in this setting arises from the inability of the uninformed player to accu-
rately know her own reservation payoff due to the unobservability of the informed
player’s type. This leads to the surplus maximizing mechanism allocating the object
to the lower valuation player with positive probability.
Another related paper is Jullien (2000) where the contracting problem between
a principal and agent is analyzed in a setting where the reservation payoff of the
agent is dependent on his type, which is his private information. The focus there is
on characterizing the profit maximizing allocation rule for the principal. In contrast, I
will solely focus on the inability of efficient mechanisms to deliver ex-post efficiency.
Finally this paper is also related to Aney (2012), which shows the conditions under
which inefficient reservation payoffs are always strictly preferred over any allocation
that can be implemented using a mechanism. The key difference is that Aney (2012)
assumes that parties cannot commit to a mechanism, and this implies that they must take
into account how truth telling at the mechanism stage modifies their reservation payoff
in the event one of the players vetoes the mechanism ex-post. In contrast, this paper
shows that when parties can commit to the outcome of the mechanism, although they
can improve over their reservation payoffs, they may not be able to attain the first best.
3 On the other hand if bargaining prior to the contest involves positive costs, it is possible to construct an
equilibrium where players will forgo bargaining even when the contest is costlier. See Anderlini and Felli
(2001).
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The next section presents the model and shows how inefficiency arises naturally
in this setting. A simple condition turns out to be both necessary and sufficient for
the first best to be implementable (Lemma 1). Section 3 analyzes the case when the
first best is not implementable. For the existence of a surplus maximizing mechanism
we need to derive the set of functions that are ‘proximate’ to the reservation payoffs
that can be implemented, and we need to ensure this set is compact. Lemma 2 derives
the necessary and sufficient condition required on this set for the existence of an
allocation that is preferred to the reservation payoffs. Proposition 1 shows that, under
mild condition on the reservation payoffs, we can construct such a set by following
the procedure described in the appendix, and ensure its compactness. The main result
of the paper is Proposition 2, which characterizes the surplus maximizing mechanism.
This result is derived under a mild condition on the distribution of types.
Section 4 shows an application of the model where the dependence in the reserva-
tion payoffs on the privately observed type arises endogenously when the reservation
payoffs arise from a contest. Since the reservation payoffs arise from the equilibrium
of a Bayesian game (a Tullock contest), the overall game becomes a multi-stage game
that must be solved using an appropriate equilibrium concept namely that of the per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium. I show that the solution to the mechanism design problem
in Sect. 3 is preserved under a restriction on the off-equilibrium beliefs. I discuss
the ramifications of the assumption that the reservation payoffs arise as equilibrium
payoffs from a Bayesian game in Sect. 4.5. Finally Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Model
There are two players with preferences that can be represented by the usual quasi linear
utility functions. The players wish to allocate an object that may be divisible among
themselves. The object is valued at θ1 by player 1 (female) and θ1 is publicly observed.
Player 2 (male) privately observes his valuation θ2. Since player 1 is uninformed about
player 2’s type, she treats it as a random variable 2 that takes values between [θ2, θ2]
with a cdf F(θ2). For now, we need not impose any restriction on this distribution which
may be continuous, discrete, or mixed. I assume that
θ1 > θ2 > θ2 ≥ 0 (1)
Unless both players agree to allocate the object using a mechanism, they both end
up with their reservation payoffs. If each player chooses to participate in the mecha-
nism, both forgo their reservation payoffs. Consequently the expected payoff from the
mechanism must be weakly greater than the reservation payoff for each player (the IR
constraint).
The reservation payoffs, which are assumed to be dependent on player 2’s type, are
denoted by
E(v1(2)) ≥ 0 and v2(θ2) ≥ 0 (2)
for player 1 and 2 respectively. Note that E(v1(2)), the reservation payoff for player
1, is an expectation since it depends on player 2’s type, which she does not observe.
On the other hand player 2 does observe his own type and his reservation payoff
123
Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable 837
is simply v2(θ2). This formulation captures the idea that both players’ reservation
payoffs depend on the state of the world θ2, which happens to be the willingness to
pay of player 2. Nature chooses θ2 according to an unspecified probability distribution.
Player 1 does not learn θ2 but player 2 does. Therefore, player 2 knows his willingness
to pay and his reservation payoff but player 1 does not. Player 1’s willingness to pay
on the other hand is θ1 and this is common knowledge. The reservation payoffs of
the two players may also depend on θ1. However since θ1 is common knowledge, the
presence or absence of dependence of the reservation payoffs on θ1 will not play any
role in the results.
Before going further it is important to restrict our attention to the case where it
is inefficient for players to receive their reservation payoffs. If on the other hand the
reservation payoffs are large enough, the first best would involve the players simply
accepting their reservation payoffs, rather than attempting to forgo them by agreeing
to an allocation of the object and transfers. I assume
∀θ2 v1(θ2) + v2(θ2) < θ1. (3)
This states that the sum of the ex-post reservation payoffs generates lower surplus than
allocating the object to player 1 for all realization of θ2. To focus on the interesting
case where the reservation payoffs feature this inefficiency, and it is indeed efficient
for players to participate in the mechanism and forgo their reservation payoffs, I will
assume inequality (3) holds throughout the paper.
Even when the reservation payoffs satisfy inequality (3), it is possible that
∃θ2 such that E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) > θ1. (4)
This is because the informational asymmetry constrains player 1’s expected payoff to
be E(v1(2)) without regard to the actual realizations of θ2. This will be the key to
the inefficiency showcased in this model. In Sect. 4 I construct an example where type
dependent reservation payoffs arise as the equilibrium payoffs from a lottery contest.
Although a contest is clearly inefficient, and consequently the equilibrium payoffs
from a contest will endogenously satisfy the inequality in (3), we will find that the
inequality in (4) may still hold.
2.1 First best
In this model inefficiency arises in a natural and simple way. I characterize this in
Lemma 1 and illustrate it in Sect. 4 with the help of an example. The main result of
the paper, namely the mechanism design problem, will be introduced and solved in
Sect. 3.
Observation 1 Ex-post efficiency is attained only if the object is allocated to
player 1.
As argued earlier, when inequality (3) is satisfied, there is an inefficiency when the
players end up with their reservation payoffs. Since player 1 always values the object
123
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more, it is more efficient to allocate it to her in exchange for a transfer to player 2.
This allocation problem can be tackled using a mechanism design approach. Let the
expected payoffs from the mechanism be μ1 and μ2(θ2) for players 1 and 2 where
μ1 = β1θ1 + t1 and μ2(θ2) = β2(θ2)θ2 + t2(θ2). (5)
β1 and β2(θ2) are the probabilities with which the object is allocated to player 1
and 2 respectively and t1 and t2(θ2) are the corresponding transfers. As the object
could be divisible, β1 and β2(θ2) may also be interpreted as the share of the object
allocated to player 1 and 2. These payoffs are the interim expected payoffs from the
mechanism. The ex-post payoffs would typically differ from these. For instance, the
actual transfer that player 1 makes may depend on the declaration of player 2. However
since there is full commitment, once the players agree on a mechanism to allocate the
surplus they must accept the ex-post allocation.4 The allocations will need to satisfy
the IC constraint for player 2 and the interim IR constraints for the two players. If
player 1 unilaterally refuses to participate in the mechanism she expects to receive
E(v1(2)). Hence the IR constraint for player 1 is μ1 ≥ E(v1(2)). Similarly if
player 2 unilaterally refuses to participate in the mechanism he expects to receive
v2(θ2) and hence his IR constraint is μ2(θ2) ≥ v2(θ2).
Since player 1’s valuation of the object is always greater than that of player 2, for
full efficiency β2(θ2) = 0,∀θ2 or conversely β1 = 1 is necessary.5 More generally
we will assume ex-post surplus feasibility and ex-post budget feasibility throughout
the paper.
Definition 1 Allocation is defined to be ex-post surplus feasible when
β1(θ2) + β2(θ2) ≤ 1 ∀θ2 (6)
and ex-post budget feasible when
t1(θ2) + t2(θ2) ≤ 0 ∀θ2 (7)
Ex-post surplus feasibility implies that the probability or share of the object cannot
add to greater than one across the two players for any realization of θ2. Second, the
sum of transfers made to the two players can never be positive since this implies the
presence of a third party subsidy. Note that budget feasibility subsumes budget balance
but allows some transfers to be burnt. However we will see in the surplus maximizing
mechanism in Sect. 3 that this is never optimal.
Lemma 1 First best under ex-post surplus and budget feasibility is implementable if
and only if
E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) ≤ θ1 ∀θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2]. (8)
4 Without full commitment, player 2 must consider the impact his declaration has on the ex-post reservation
payoffs. This model is analyzed in Aney (2012).
5 The object being allocated to player 1 is necessary but not sufficient for full efficiency since part of the
transfers made by the players may be burnt.
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Proof To start with, note that since we require β2(θ2) = 0 for all θ2 in the first best,
t2(θ2) must some constant t2 to ensure incentive compatibility. If not, player 2 will
make the declaration that yields the highest transfer. Hence we have t2(θ2) = t2 for
all θ2.
I will first prove sufficiency. Set t2 = max{v2(θ2)}. This satisfies IR constraint of
player 2 for any type θ2. Since E(v1(2)) ≤ θ1 − max{v2(θ2)} the IR constraint of
player 1 is also satisfied. This shows that the first best is implementable.
I will now prove necessity. Consider the case when there exists a θ2 such that
E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) > θ1. To ensure the IR constraint is satisfied for player 2 of any
type we need t2 ≥ max{v2(θ2)}. This however violates the IR constraint for player
1. To see this note that ex-ante budget feasibility implies t2 ≤ −t1. Hence we must
at least have −t1 ≥ max{v2(θ2)}. Substituting this into the IR constraint of player
1 we find that E(v1(2)) > θ1 − max{v2(θ2)}. This shows that the first best is not
implementable. unionsq
This observation shows that if the overestimation of her reservation payoff by player
1 is large enough, it is impossible to allocate the object to her while satisfying the IR
constraint of player 2. It is worth noting that the condition under which the first best
is possible does not rely directly on the distribution of player 2’s type, which could be
discrete or continuous.6
There is a connection between this inefficiency result and the one presented in the
literature on interdependent valuations. Define net valuations as the difference between
valuations and the reservation payoff. Then the net valuations of player 1 and 2 are
θ1 − E(v1(2)) and θ2 − v2(θ2) (9)
and these depend on player 2’s type. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show in a related
environment that efficiency is hard to get with interdependent valuations. Mezzetti
(2004) critiques their paper and shows that efficiency is always possible if transfers
can be conditioned on players’ observation of their payoffs after an outcome is decided.
However there are important differences between these results and the result in Lemma
1. First, the interdependence here is at the level of net valuations, not valuations. In
particular, efficiency here does not mean assigning the object to the player with the
highest net valuation, but the one with the highest valuation. As a result the inefficiency
result here does not follow from Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). Second, efficiency
requires that the object be given to player 1 and the reservation payoffs are never
realized. Consequently player 1 does not discover anything about player 2’s type.
Hence the innovation of the two stage mechanism used in Mezzetti (2004) would not
work here.7
To see the intuition for this result, note that the object must always be allocated to
player 1 in exchange for a transfer to player 2 to attain the first best. Consequently
the only incentive compatible transfer schedule is one that is flat in the declaration
6 Condition in (8) is reminiscent of the condition in Makowsky and Mezzetti (1994) who show that this
condition is necessary and sufficient for ex-post efficiency in a private values setting with several players.
However for this the distribution of 2 needs to satisfy a richness property that is not required here.
7 I thank Claudio Mezzetti for pointing this out.
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of player 2. However if v2(θ2) is large enough for some θ2, it will not be possible
to transfer enough to player 2 while satisfying the IR constraint of player 1. As a
consequence of this, whenever there exists a θ2 such that E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) > θ1,
we will find in Sect. 3 that there exists some inefficiency as we will need β2(θ2) > 0
for some θ2.
Corollary 1 First best is implementable whenever ex-post budget feasibility is
relaxed.
Proof Since player 1 values the object more than player 2, allocating the object to
player 1 along with a transfer to player to of t2(θ2) = max{v2(θ2)},∀θ2 will ensure
the first best. These transfers are feasible if budget feasibility is relaxed since the
constraint t2(θ2) ≤ θ1 − E(v1(2)) no longer applies. unionsq
This corollary follows from the results in Groves (1973), Arrow (1979) and
d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) that prove the feasibility of the first best in
this environment whenever budget feasibility is relaxed.
In this section I have constructed an example where type dependent reservation
payoffs arise as the equilibrium payoffs from a default game that is clearly inefficient
but still satisfies (4). This clarifies the point that the reservation payoffs could arise
from a class of inefficient games, that yield payoffs that satisfies inequality (3) and
consequently players prefer to avoid. However since the payoffs also satisfy inequality
(4), the first best allocation is not attainable. Moreover, this section shows how this
model applies to a situation with incomplete property rights.
3 Second best
In this section I will derive the main results of the paper. Since we are concerned with
the second best, we can restrict our attention to the case where there exists a θ2 such
that
E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) − θ1 > 0. (10)
When this condition is satisfied, we are in the second best where player 2 must be
allocated the object with positive probability.
In this section I first derive the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of an implementable allocation in Lemma 2. Even though this guarantees that
players can do better than their reservation payoffs, it falls short of providing us the
surplus maximizing mechanism. This question is tackled in Propositions 1 and 2. For
characterizing the surplus maximizing mechanism we need to characterize the set
of implementable functions that are ‘proximate’ to the reservation payoff of player
2. More importantly we need to ensure that this set is compact since this set is the
domain over which the optimization yielding the surplus maximizing mechanism is
conducted. In Proposition 1 I show that using a procedure described in the appendix,
it is possible to recover such a set as long as the reservation payoff of player 2 satisfies
some mild conditions. Moreover, this result also proves that the resulting set is com-
pact. In Proposition 2, the surplus maximizing mechanism is derived using the set of
functions derived in Proposition 1. Finally in Sect. 4, I present an application of the
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model, show the impossibility of reaching the first best, and solve for the second best
mechanism.
To proceed further it is necessary to specify the distribution of θ2. For now I assume
that θ2 is drawn from a continuous distribution with a probability density function
f (θ2) on the interval [θ2, θ2]. As a result of the revelation principle, we can restrict
our attention to a direct mechanism where player 2 makes a declaration θ˜2 and gets a
payoff
μ2(θ˜2) = θ2β2(θ˜2) + t2(θ˜2), (11)
where β2(θ˜2) ∈ [0, 1]. Since quasi linear payoffs of this form satisfy the single crossing
property,
θ2β
′
2(θ2) + t ′2(θ2) = 0 and β ′2(θ2) ≥ 0 ∀θ2, (12)
are each necessary, and together sufficient, to ensure that the incentive compatibility
constraint for player 2 is satisfied.8 Using the well known procedure first introduced
in Mirrlees (1971) we know that
∂μ2(θ2)
∂θ2
= β2(θ2) + θ2β ′2(θ2) + t ′2(θ2) = β2(θ2), (13)
implying that under incentive compatibility the expected payoff from negotiations for
player 2 of type θ2 is
μ2(θ2) = μ2(θ2) +
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(w)dw. (14)
From (14) we have μ′2(θ2) = β2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1]. Using this and (14) we can rewrite the
constraints in (12) as constraints on μ2(θ2) as
μ′2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1] and μ′′2(θ2) ≥ 0. (15)
The constraints in (15) are merely a restatement of constraints that are known to be
necessary and sufficient for incentive compatibility. In addition to the IC constraints
in (15), player 2’s payoff must also satisfy the IR constraint, which is
μ2(θ2) ≥ v2(θ2). (16)
Since player 1’s type is publicly observed we only need to satisfy her IR constraint,
which is μ1 ≥ E(v1(2)). Once we find a μ2(θ2) satisfying the constraints in (15)
we can recover
β2(θ2) = μ′2(θ2) and t2(θ2) = μ2(θ2) − θ2μ′2(θ2). (17)
The key problem of deriving the surplus maximizing mechanism that is unique to
this setting is the following. Since we have not imposed any restriction on v2(θ2), it
8 See Chapter 2.3.3.1 in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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may be the case that v2(θ2) does not satisfy the conditions in (15), that is, we may not
have v′2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1] and v′′2 (θ2) ≥ 0. As a result of this we need to find the function
that is ‘closest’ to v2(θ2) but does satisfy (15), so that we may implement it while
minimizing the inefficiency arising from allocating the object to player 2.
This problem may be solved in the following three steps. First we find a function or
functions that satisfy the IC constraints in (15) and the IR constraint in (16) for player
2. Second, we restrict our attention to those functions, which if implemented, would
also satisfy the IR constraint of player 1. Finally, if there are two or more functions that
satisfy these constraints we need to identify the one that minimizes the inefficiency
that arises in the second best. Let us consider the first step and construct a set 
composed of all functions that satisfy the IR and IC constraints of player 2. We call
such a function a proximate implementable function.
Definition 2 A proximate implementable function η(θ2) for v2(θ2) is defined on θ2
in the interval [θ 2, θ2]. It is differentiable except at finitely many points, continuous,
and convex, with
η′(θ2) ∈ [0, 1], and η(θ2) ≥ v2(θ2) (18)
and there does not exist another function η˜(θ2) satisfying the same constraints such
that η(θ2) ≥ η˜(θ2) for all θ2 and η(θ2) > η˜(θ2) for some θ2. Let  be the set of all
proximate implementable functions for v2(θ2).
Since we allow proximate functions to be non-differentiable at finitely many points,
we need to appropriately define η′(θ2) to ensure its existence for all θ2. For each η(θ2),
let S be the set of points where η(θ2) is non differentiable. Since the derivative of η(θ2)
is not defined at points s ∈ S, define
η′(θ2) =
{
limθ2→s−
η(θ2)−η(s)
θ2−s if θ2 = s ∈ S
∂η(θ2)
∂θ2
otherwise.
(19)
This definition merely ensures that η′(θ2) is well defined at all points in the interval
[θ2, θ2]. We can now proceed to the second step of restricting our attention to those
elements of  that also satisfy the IR constraint for player 1 when implemented.
Lemma 2 For any v2(θ2) defined on the interval [θ2, θ2], an allocation satisfying
ex-post budget and surplus feasibility, IC and IR constraints exists if and only if there
exists an η(θ2) ∈  such that
E(η(2)) −
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)η′(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 ≤ θ1 − E(v1(2)). (20)
Proof By Definition 2 we know that  is the collection of functions η(θ2) that satisfy
the IC and IR constraint of player 2. Moreover, these function cannot be improved
upon since we rule out η(θ2) if there exists a η˜(θ2) that satisfies the constraints in (18)
and η(θ2) ≥ η˜(θ2) for all θ2 and η(θ2) > η˜(θ2) for some θ2.
Using (17), we can construct the corresponding allocation for a given η(θ2), and
we have β2(θ2) = η′(θ2) and t2(θ2) = η(θ2) − θ2η′(θ2) for player 2. For player 1 we
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can at most have β1 = 1 − E(β2(2)) and t1 = −E(t2(2)). Hence, when the payoff
of player 2 is η(θ2), the payoff of player 1 is at most β1θ1 + t1, which equals
θ1 − E(η(2)) −
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)η′(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2. (21)
This satisfies the IR constraint if and only if (20) is satisfied. unionsq
This result shows the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an
incentive compatible and ex-post budget feasible allocation that makes both players,
at least weakly better off. This is what the inequality in (20) ensures. In general the
function η(θ2) need not be unique. Although all functions η(θ2) that satisfy inequal-
ity in (20), make the two players better off, typically there will be one element that
dominates the others – namely the surplus maximizing mechanism. This will be char-
acterized in Proposition 2. Before turning to this problem, we need to know how the
set  is derived, and ensure its compactness. This is what Proposition 1 does.
Proposition 1 When v2(θ2) is twice differentiable and either concave or convex, the
set  may be recovered using the procedure described in steps 1 – 8 in the appendix.
Furthermore, under these conditions, the set  is compact.
Proof Proof in the appendix. unionsq
Proposition 1 shows that following the procedure described in the appendix we can
recover the set  which includes all proximate implementable functions for a given
v2(θ2) under the assumption that v2(θ2) is twice differentiable and either concave or
convex. In particular whenv2(θ2) is convex, has only one element. This is established
in step 5 of the procedure in the appendix. If v2(θ2) is concave, there are infinitely
many proximate implementable functions that are potential candidates to be used for
the construction of the surplus maximizing mechanism. The characterization of the
surplus maximizing mechanism that follows in Proposition 2 requires optimization
over the set . For this optimization exercise to yield a solution, we need  to be
compact. From Proposition 1 we know that this is guaranteed as long as v2(θ2) is
either concave or convex.
Proposition 2 Assume v2(θ2) is twice differentiable and either concave or convex,
(θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2, and there exists an η(θ2) satisfying (20). The
surplus maximizing mechanism must take the form
β2(θ2) = μ′2(θ2) and t2(θ2) = μ2(θ2) − θ2μ′2(θ2) if θ2 ≥ θ2 > θˆ2,
β2(θ2) = 0 and t2(θ2) = μ2(θˆ2) if θˆ2 ≥ θ2 ≥ θ2,
β1 = 1 − E(β2(2)) and t1 = −E(t2(2)).
(22)
where
μ2(θ2) = argmax
η(θ2)∈
(∫ θ2
θˆ2
(θ2 − θ1)η′(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2
)
(23)
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and θˆ2 is the highest value of θ2 that satisfies
E(v1(2)) = θ1 − F(θˆ2)η(θˆ2) −
∫ θ2
θˆ2
(θ1 − θ2)η′(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2. (24)
Proof The social planner’s problem is to maximize μ1 +E(μ2(2)) subject to the IR
constraints for the two players and the IC constraint for player 2. To begin with, note
that in the surplus maximizing mechanism we must have
β1 = 1 − E(β2(2)) and t1 = −E(t2(2)). (25)
This is because
β1 > 1 − E(β2(2)) or t1 > −E(t2(2)) (26)
will violate budget or surplus feasibility and
β1 < 1 − E(β2(2)) or t1 < −E(t2(2)) (27)
can always be improved upon by allocating the unused expected surplus or expected
transfers to player 1 without violating any constraints, thereby increasing total surplus.
Using these two constraints, the social planner’s problem modifies to
min
β2(θ2)
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)β2(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2, (28)
subject to the IR constraints of the two players, and the IC constraint of player 2.
Ignoring for now the problem of identifying the optimal η(θ2) ∈ , and assuming
that the optimal η(θ2) is known, we must have μ2(θ2) ≥ η(θ2) for all θ2 since μ2(θ2) <
η(θ2) will violate either the participation or the IC constraints of player 2. Given (14),
for each θ2 we need ∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx ≥ η(θ2) − μ2(θ 2). (29)
We will see that the solution to (28), will correspond to the solution of minimizing
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx (30)
with respect to β2(x) subject to (29). To minimize (30) while ensuring that (29) is
satisfied, we can see that μ2(θ2) must be set as high as possible as this allows us to
lower
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx . Let θˆ2 be the value of θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2] such that η(θˆ2) = μ2(θ2) is
the highest value of μ2(θ2) feasible due to budget feasibility. For a player 2 with a
type θ2 > θˆ2 the constraint (29) modifies to
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∫ θ2
θˆ2
β2(x)dx ≥ η(θ2) − η(θˆ2). (31)
The lowest possible β2(θ2) that satisfies this is
β2(θ2) = η′(θ2) for θ2 > θˆ2. (32)
By construction this satisfies the IR constraint and the IC constraint for player 2 with
type θ2 > θˆ2. For θ2 ≤ θˆ2 we can simply set β2(θ2) = 0 and μ2(θ2) = t2(θ2) = η(θˆ2).
This satisfies the IR and IC constraints for a player 2 with type θ2 ≤ θˆ2. Since∫ θ2
θˆ2
β2(θ2)dθ2 is decreasing in θˆ2 we can solve for the highest possible θˆ2 that satisfies
equation (24), which is the IR constraint for player 1. This gives us the allocation in
(22).
We will now see that the solution we have derived corresponds to the solution for
(28). Consider a b(θ2) = β2(θ2) such that
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)b(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 <
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)β2(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2. (33)
I will show by contradiction that an implementable b(θ2) cannot exist since (θ1 −
θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2. First note that β2(θ2) minimizes
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx sub-
ject to the constraint in (29). Hence we must have
∫ θ2
θ2
b(x)dx >
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx . (34)
Second note that we must have b(θ2) > 0 for some interval in [θ2, θˆ2]. If not, following
from (33), we must have
∫ θ2
θˆ2
(θ1 − θ2)b(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 <
∫ θ2
θˆ2
(θ1 − θ2)β2(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2. (35)
But since β2(θ2) is determined when the constraint in (29) binds for θ2 > θˆ2, b(θ2)
must violate this constraint for the inequality in (35) to be satisfied, and consequently
such a b(θ2) is not implementable. Hence we must have an interval in [θ2, θˆ2] where
b(θ2) > 0. However, recall that (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2. This implies
that (33) cannot be true. To see this construct c(θ2) such that
∫ θ2
θ2
b(x)dx =
∫ θ2
θ2
c(x)dx, (36)
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and c(θ2) = 0 for θ2 ≤ θˆ2. The total inefficiency with c(θ2) must satisfy
∫ θ2
θˆ2
(θ1 − θ2)c(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 <
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)b(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2, (37)
Since (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2. However since
∫ θ2
θ2
c(x)dx =∫ θ2
θ2
b(x)dx >
∫ θ2
θ2
β2(x)dx , and c(θ2) = β2(θ2) = 0 for θ2 ≤ θˆ2, we must have
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)c(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 >
∫ θ2
θ2
(θ1 − θ2)β2(θ2) f (θ2)dθ2. (38)
This contradicts (33), proving that β2(θ2) is optimal given the optimal η(θ2).
Finally, the optimal η(θ2) ∈  is found by choosing η(θ2) that minimizes the inef-
ficiency resulting from the second best allocation, which is equivalent to the solution
of (23). A solution to (23) is guaranteed to exist by the Weierstrass theorem since
the integral is a continuous function over the domain , which is guaranteed to be
compact by Proposition 1 when v2(θ2) is either concave or convex. unionsq
Proposition 2 characterizes the surplus maximizing mechanism. We see that in
the surplus maximizing mechanism, a player 2 with type θ2 less than a threshold θˆ2
will be allocated the object with zero probability. The threshold θˆ2 is endogenously
determined, and is set as high as possible at the point where the IR constraint of
player 1 binds. This result relies on (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) being non-increasing in θ2. If this
assumption is violated, it is not possible to impose a structure on the surplus maxi-
mizing mechanism and the shape of β2(θ2) will vary with the distribution of θ2. In
general, it may then become optimal to allocate surplus to player 2 with type lower
than θˆ2 with positive probability. However, although it is not possible to character-
ize the surplus maximizing mechanism in this case, Lemma 2 shows that as long as
there exists at least one η(θ2) in the set  that satisfies (20), it is possible to imple-
ment an allocation that at least weakly dominates the reservation payoffs for both
players.
The result in Proposition 2 also relies on v2(θ2) being twice differentiable and either
concave or convex. This is a simplifying assumption that is needed in Proposition 1 to
ensure that  is compact. Compactness is sufficient (although not necessary) for the
optimization exercise in Proposition 2 to yield the surplus maximizing mechanism.9
In the absence of compactness we are left only with the result in Lemma 2 that guar-
antees at least one implementable allocation that dominates the reservation payoffs,
but without the certainty about the existence of the surplus maximizing mechanism.
In particular in the the absence of compactness of  it may be possible that for any
η(θ2) ∈  that satisfies the IR constraint of player 1, there may exist another element
in  that generates more total surplus.
9 For a formal statement of the Weierstrass Theorem see Ok (2007).
123
Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable 847
4 An application
Consider an intellectual property dispute between two firms. The two firms are using
a technology that each firm claims to have patented. Since the scope of the patent held
by each firm is somewhat broad, both firms have a plausible claim over the technology
they are using. Firm 1 is a large publicly listed firm with expected profits that are
publicly observable. Consequently it is known that if firm 1 operates the technology
exclusively, it will lead to expected profits of θ1. Firm 2 is a small new firm and certain
aspects of its production process are not publicly observable. However it is known that
since it is a smaller firm, it does not enjoy economies of scale, and is consequently less
efficient than firm 1. If firm 2 has the exclusive right to operate the technology, its profits
are either θ2 with probability q ∈ (0, 1) or θ2 = 0 with probability 1−q. If either of the
two firms chooses not to negotiate, the dispute will be resolved by the court. Assume for
now that the refusal to negotiate reveals nothing about the type of player 2 and that the
posterior beliefs of firm 1 are the same as its prior. We will see in Sect. 4.3 that refusal
to negotiate is off-equilibrium and we are free to specify off-equilibrium beliefs in this
way. To simplify things further, assume that the market value of the technology is zero
and this implies that neither firm wants to acquire exclusive right to it for its resale
value. We can treat this dispute as a multi-stage game where the stages are specified as
follows:
Timeline:
1. The two firms independently choose whether to litigate or negotiate.
2. If both firms have chosen to negotiate, their payoffs are determined by the surplus
maximizing mechanism in Proposition 3 and the game ends.
3. If either of the two firms has chosen not to negotiate, litigation is triggered. In this
case firm 1 updates its belief about firm 2 and the two firms simultaneously choose
litigation effort. The court determines the allocation and the game ends.
We can solve this game backwards by starting with the litigation sub-game. The payoff
from litigation will become the reservation payoffs that define the IR constraints of the
firms in stage 1. In the following section, I model litigation as a contest. In Sect. 4.4
the results are extended to the case where litigation is an unspecified Bayesian game
and the distribution of types for firm 2 is continuous.
4.1 Litigation game
Following a large literature10 that models litigation as a contest, I assume that the two
firms face the following objective functions in court.
θ1P(x˜1, x˜2) − x˜1 and θ2(1 − P(x˜1, x˜2)) − x˜2
10 See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Hay and Spier (1998) for a review.
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where
P(x˜1, x˜2) =
{
1 if x˜1 = x˜2 = 0
x˜λ1
x˜λ1 +x˜λ2
otherwise, where λ ∈ (0, 1). (39)
The Tullock contest11 has been used extensively for modeling litigation.12 Firm 1 and
2 non-cooperatively choose x˜1 and x˜2 respectively. These are the amounts the two
firms spend on litigation, for example the costs of legal counsel. Since the patent is
indivisible, ex-post it must be allocated to one of the two firms. P(x˜1, x˜2) is the proba-
bility with which the court decides in favor of firm 1. We see that the probability with
which the court allocates the patent to a firm is increasing in its effort and decreasing
in the effort of its opponent.13 This could reflect the fact that lawyers who are more
persuasive in court, are also more expensive as they help their client win with a higher
probability.14
We can solve for the equilibrium litigation payoffs for the firms. These will become
E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2), the reservation payoffs of the firms, and any expected allocation
at the mechanism design stage must be greater than these to satisfy the IR constraints
of the two firms. To derive the equilibrium payoffs we must first compute the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium effort levels x1 and x2(θ2).
First note that x2(0) = 0 as firm 2 is strictly worse off by exerting any positive
effort when its valuation is zero. This implies that the equilibrium payoff v2(0) = 0
irrespective of the effort of firm 1. Hence the optimal effort levels for firm 1 and high
value firm 2 are
x1 = argmax
x˜1
(
θ1q
x˜λ1
x˜λ1 + x2(θ2)λ
+ (1 − q)θ1 − x˜1
)
(40)
and
x2(θ2) = argmax
x˜2
(
θ2
x˜λ2
x1λ + x˜λ2
− x˜2
)
. (41)
11 This is a close variant of the Tullock “lottery” contest function that has been studied in the contest
literature. See Skaperdas (1996) for its axiomatic foundations. The slight variation comes from the fact that
P(x˜1, x˜2) = 1 rather than 1/2 when x˜1 = x˜2 = 0. This helps in avoiding issues of existence of equilibrium
but is otherwise innocuous. λ ∈ (0, 1) guarantees that the objective function is concave which ensures that
we can rely on the first order conditions to characterize the optimal efforts of the firms.
12 Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), uses the same function as the one used here. Farmer and Pecorino
(1999), and Katz (1988) also use the Tullock form while allowing for the court to treat the two parties
asymmetrically. It is easy to generalize the results presented here to the case when one of the two firms has
a stronger claim to the technology and consequently the court is more likely to rule in its favor. Since this
doesn’t add anything substantial to this example, I opt for the simpler formulation where the two sides are
symmetric before the court. Finally Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), and Robson and Skaperdas (2008),
also use a generalization of the Tullock contest function in the context of litigation.
13 Since the firms bear their own costs, in this example the court follows the US fee shifting rule rather
than the English one where it is not uncommon for the loser to be made to pay part of the winner’s costs.
14 See Skaperdas and Vaidya (2009) for the axiomatic foundation for how persuasion may be modeled as
a contest.
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The first order conditions of the two firms give us
qθ1
θ2
= x1
x2(θ2)
. (42)
Substituting this into the objective functions, and setting θ
λ
2
(qθ1)λ+θλ2
=: γ , we have
E(v1(2)) = θ1q(1 − γ )(1 − λγ ) + θ1(1 − q), v2(0) = 0,
and v2(θ2) = θ2γ (1 − λ(1 − γ )). (43)
Since γ is a function of q, we observe that v2(θ2) depends on the belief of firm 1.
4.2 Negotiations
In this section we will see that the first best outcome, that of allocating the surplus to
firm 1 in exchange for a transfer to firm 2, is not implementable under budget balance.
I will also derive the surplus maximizing mechanism.
Before we do this we need to be mindful of the following issue when defining the
IR constraints of the two firms. In Bayesian games the equilibrium payoffs of the
players are a function of the beliefs of the other players. With the Tullock contest in
(39), we see from the expressions in (43) that the equilibrium payoffs for both firms
are a function of q, the prior with which firm 1 believes firm 2 to be a high type. This
is not a problem when firm 1 contemplates a refusal to negotiate – in case of refusal to
negotiate firm 1 learns nothing about firm 2’s type and the reservation payoff of firm 1
is correctly computed to be E(v1(2)). However it is possible that refusal to negotiate
by firm 2 conveys some information about the type of firm 2. Since the Tullock contest
equilibrium effort levels x1 and x2(θ2) depend on this belief, this modifies v2(θ2). In
other words, to compute the correct reservation payoff that defines its IR constraint,
firm 2 needs to consider what its reservation payoff would be under the belief of firm
1 that is induced by firm 2’s refusal to negotiate. This issue does not arise in Sects.
2 and 3 since there the reservation payoff of player 2 does not depend on player 1’s
beliefs.
To deal with this issue I use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept to
solve this multi-stage game. In short this problem is resolved by adopting the following
off-equilibrium belief for firm 1– whenever firm 2 refuses to negotiate, firm 1’s poste-
rior is equal to its prior. Since in equilibrium, firm 2 always negotiates, this restriction
on off-equilibrium beliefs will imply that the beliefs of firm 1 remain the same regard-
less of whether firm 2 negotiates, and this allows us to pin down the IR constraint of
firm 2 to v2(θ2) in (43), allowing us to solve for the surplus maximizing mechanism.
4.2.1 First best
Before we verify that the first best is not implementable, note that condition (3) is
satisfied here and it is efficient to avoid litigation. To see this note
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v1(θ2) + v2(θ2) < θ1 and v1(0) + v2(0) < θ1, (44)
where
v1(θ2) = θ1P(x1, x2(θ2)) − x1 and v1(0) = θ1P(x1, x2(0)) − x1. (45)
Noting that x2(θ2) and x1 are strictly positive, it is easy to see that the inequalities in
(44) are satisfied. This is because both firms burn resources during litigation and this
is a standard inefficiency associated with contests. As a result it is more efficient to
avoid litigation by allocating the object to firm 1 in exchange for a transfer to firm 2.
To see that this first best allocation is not implementable we check that inequality in
(4) may also hold in this example. For this it is sufficient to show that
E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) > θ1 (46)
⇔ θ1q(1 − γ )(1 − λγ ) + θ1(1 − q) + θ2γ (1 − λ(1 − γ )) > θ1 (47)
⇔ θ1q(1 − γ )(1 − λγ ) + θ2γ (1 − λ(1 − γ )) > qθ1 (48)
⇔ θ2(1 − λ(1 − γ )) > qθ1(2 − λγ ). (49)
Since γ is decreasing in q, the left hand side of (49) also decreases in q, while the right
hand side is increasing in q. Moreover γ → 1 as q → 0 and consequently as q → 0,
the left hand side goes to θ2 and the right hand side goes to zero. The continuity and
monotonicity of the two sides in q implies that there must exist a threshold qˆ ∈ (0, 1)
such that inequality (4) is satisfied for all q < qˆ . Using Lemma 1 we can state the
following.
Observation 2 It is not possible to allocate the patent to firm 1 in exchange for a
transfer to firm 2 when q < qˆ .
To summarize, in this example we find that if the probability with which firm 2 is
a high type is low enough, it will not be possible for the two firms to reach the first
best by allocating the right to use the technology to firm 1 with probability one, in
exchange for a transfer to firm 2.
4.2.2 Second best
We can solve for the surplus maximizing mechanism in this application for the case
when the first best is not implementable. The reservation payoffs that define the firm’s
IR constraint are E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2) from (43). Since the distribution of types here
is discrete, the result in this section is not subsumed in the result in Proposition 2
which was derived under the assumption that the distribution of θ2 is continuous.
Proposition 3 The surplus maximizing mechanism always exists and comprises of
β2(θ2) = E(v1(2))+v2(θ2)−θ1
θ2−qθ1 and t2(θ2) = v2(θ2) − β2(θ2)θ2
β2(0) = 0 and t2(0) = v2(θ2) − β2(θ2)θ2
β1 = 1 − qβ2(θ2) and t1 = β2(θ2)θ2 − v2(θ2).
(50)
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Proof The IR constraints for firm 1 and 2 are
β1θ1 + t1 ≥ E(v1(2)), β2(θ2)θ2 + t2(θ2) ≥ v2(θ2), and t2(0) ≥ 0 (51)
The IC constraints are
(β2(θ2) − β2(0))θ2 ≥ t2(0) − t2(θ2) ≥ (β2(θ2) − β2(0)) · 0. (52)
To minimize the inefficiency of the second best allocation we need to minimize β2(θ2).
The inequalities in (52) indicate that we can simultaneously reduce β2(θ2) and β2(0)
while keeping IC constraints intact. Hence we can set β2(0) = 0. The IC constraints
simplify to t2(0) = t2(θ2) = t2.
In the surplus maximizing mechanism we must have
β1 = 1 − E(β2(2)) and t1 = −E(t2(2)) (53)
since
β1 > 1 − E(β2(2)) or t1 > −E(t2(2)) (54)
are ruled out by surplus and budget feasibility and
β1 < 1 − E(β2(2)) or t1 < −E(t2(2)) (55)
can be improved by allocating the excess surplus to firm 1 without violating any
constraint. Substituting β1 = 1 − E(β2(2)) = 1 − qβ2(θ2) and t1 = −E(t2(2)) =
−t2 into the IR constraints of two firms in (51) we have
(1 − qβ2(θ2))θ1 − t2 ≥ E(v1(2)), β2(θ2)θ2 + t2 ≥ v2(θ2), and t2 ≥ 0. (56)
The IR constraint of firm 1 and high type firm 2 indicate that we can keep both
intact if we simultaneously decrease β2(θ2) and increase t2 till both constraints hold
with an equality. Once we do this we can solve for β2(θ2) and find that
β2(θ2) = E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) − θ1
θ2 − qθ1
. (57)
To check that β2(θ2) ∈ (0, 1) note first that inequality (4) simplifies to inequality in
(49) when the reservation payoffs arise as the equilibrium payoffs from the contest in
this example. Since 2 − λγ > 1 − 1λ(1 − γ ), inequality (49) implies that θ2 > qθ1
must hold when the first best is not attainable. This implies that the denominator in
(57) is positive. For β2(θ2) < 1 we need θ2 + (1 − q)θ1 > v1 + v2(θ2). To see this
always holds, use expressions in (43) for E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2), and note that
θ2 + (1 − q)θ1 > E(v1(2)) + v2(θ2) (58)
⇔ θ2 + (1 − q)θ1 > qθ1(1 − γ )(1 − λγ ) + (1 − q)θ1 + θ2γ (1 − λ(1 − γ )) (59)
⇔ θ2(1 + λγ ) > qθ1(1 − λγ ), (60)
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which always holds since we have just shown that inequality (49) implies θ2 > qθ1.
This shows that β2(θ2) always exists. We can derive β1, t1, and t2 = t2(0) = t2(θ2)
as
t2 = v2(θ2) − β2(θ2)θ2 t1 = −t2 and β1 = 1 − qβ2(θ2) unionsq
Proposition 3 shows the best the two firms can do in this setting. Although this
mechanism involves some inefficiency since β2(θ2) > 0, it still pareto dominates
the reservation payoffs. At the optimal allocation, the IR constraint of firm 1 and
a high type firm 2 bind and consequently they must receive E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2)
respectively. However a low type firm 2 receives t2 > 0 and this is strictly greater that
its payoff under the contest which is zero. This illustrates the point that in this setting
it is the low valuation firm 2 that receives an informational rent. This appears to be a
robust feature in this model as we also see it in Proposition 2.
4.3 Equilibrium
Finally, using the allocations from the surplus maximizing mechanism derived in
Proposition 3 we can derive the equilibrium of this game. I use perfect Bayesian
equilibrium as the solution concept. As is well known, such an equilibrium is defined
by two elements – first, the strategy of each firm must be sequentially rational, and
second, the beliefs of firm 1 must be updated using the Bayes rule wherever possible.
The strategy for each firm comprises of a unilateral decision of whether or not to
negotiate and a litigation effort if litigation is triggered. In addition to this we need
to fully specify the beliefs of firm 1 about firm 2’s type given the actions of firm 2 at
each node.
Observation 3 The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
1. Firm 1 chooses to negotiate. If firm 2 chooses litigation (off-equilibrium) firm 1
chooses effort x1 derived in equation (40).
2. Firm 2 chooses to negotiate. If firm 1 chooses litigation (off-equilibrium) it chooses
effort 0 if θ2 = 0 and the effort derived in equation (41) if θ2 = θ2.
3. Firm 1’s posterior is equal to its prior when firm 2 chooses to negotiate or litigate.
We can see that negotiation is an equilibrium by noting that given firm 1 chooses to
negotiate, a low type firm 2 is strictly better off by choosing to negotiate, and a high
type firm 2 is indifferent between negotiation and litigation. Hence negotiation is a
best response for firm 2. Similarly if firm 2 chooses to negotiate, it is a best response
for firm 1 to negotiate since it does not gain by triggering litigation. This is because
we know from Proposition 3 that firm 1 and high type firm 2 are pushed to their
reservation payoffs in the surplus maximizing mechanism whereas a low type firm
2 receives rents. Since firm 2 always negotiates, in equilibrium the posterior belief
of firm 1 must remain the same as its prior by Bayes rule. The equilibrium satisfies
this as the prior of firm 1 is used as the distribution to derive the surplus maximizing
mechanism in Proposition 3.
Note that it is also an equilibrium for both firms to choose litigation since conditional
on one firm triggering litigation, it is a best response for the other firm to also choose
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litigation. However this equilibrium is less plausible since it involves the firms playing
weakly dominated strategies.
4.4 Extension
In this section I allow the litigation sub-game to be an unspecified Bayesian game.
Moreover instead of a discrete distribution, now firm 2’s type is drawn from a con-
tinuous distribution with a probability density function f (θ2) on the interval [θ2, θ2]
where (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2. The timeline of the game is the same
as the one we used at the start of Sect. 4. We will see that the surplus maximizing
mechanism exists in this setting and is characterized by the one in Proposition 2.
Let the equilibrium payoffs of the two firms in the litigation sub-game, under the
prior belief of firm 1, be E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2). Assume that the Bayesian game is ex-
post inefficient in that these payoffs satisfy the inefficiency condition in (3). Assume
for now that the posterior belief of firm 1 about firm 2’s type remains the same as the
prior if firm 2 chooses to litigate. Just as before, litigation will be off-equilibirum here
and we will be free to specify the belief this way in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
that follows. If E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2) satisfy the condition in (4), then the first best
will not be implementable since Lemma 1 applies. Hence the patent cannot always be
allocated to firm 1. The following Proposition shows that in this setting the surplus
maximizing mechanism from Proposition 2 applies.
Proposition 4 Assume that (θ1−θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2, and the reservation
payoffs arise from an inefficient Bayesian game where v2(θ2) is twice differentiable.
The surplus maximizing mechanism is characterized by the one in Proposition 2.
Proof To prove this I will first show that η(θ2) = v2(θ2) is unique. Next we will see
that v2(θ2) must satisfy the inequality in (20) since it represents the equilibrium payoff
from a Bayesian game that is inefficient. Finally the assumption that (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2)
is non-increasing in θ2 ensures that all conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied and it
follows that the surplus maximizing mechanism is the one characterized there.
First, we will see that when v2(θ2) arises from a Bayesian game and the preferences
of the firms are quasi-linear, we must have v′2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1] and v′′2 (θ2) ≥ 0. By the
revelation principle, for any equilibrium of a Bayesian game there exists an equivalent
direct mechanism where firm 2 declares its true type. The equilibrium payoff v2(θ2)
can be represented as
v2(θ2) = θ2α(θ2) + x(θ2), (61)
where α(θ2) is equilibrium probability with which the patent is allocated to firm 2 of
type θ2 and x(θ2) is the corresponding equilibrium transfer in the direct mechanism.
Let firm 2 declare a type θ˜2 in the direct mechanism. Hence while playing the direct
mechanism firm 2 maximizes
max
θ˜2∈[θ2,θ2]
(θ2α(θ˜2) + x(θ˜2)) (62)
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For θ˜2 = θ2 to be the equilibrium, the first and second order conditions simplify to
α(θ2) ≥ 0 and α′(θ2) ≥ 0. (63)
Since α(θ2) must take a value in the interval [0, 1], and v′2(θ2) = α(θ2), we find that
v′2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly since v′′2 (θ2) = α′(θ2), we must have v′′2 (θ2) ≥ 0. This
implies that v2(θ2) = η(θ2) is unique.
Second, we have assumed that the Bayesian game is inefficient in that condition
(3) is satisfied. This implies that we must have
E(v1(2)) + E(v2(2)) < θ1 (64)
which is sufficient for the inequality in (20) to be satisfied since η(θ2) = v2(θ2).
Finally, we have assumed that (θ1 − θ2) f (θ2) is non-increasing in θ2. This ensures all
three conditions required for the surplus maximizing mechanism in Proposition 2 are
satisfied. unionsq
Proposition 4 shows that we can use the surplus maximizing mechanism from
Proposition 2 when reservation payoffs arise from an inefficient Bayesian game. Using
this we can construct a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that both firms prefer to
negotiate and receive these allocations rather than choosing to litigate.
To make this point clearly, define σ1 and σ2(θ2) as the equilibrium strategies in the
litigation sub-game when it is played under the prior beliefs of firm 1. These are the
strategies that lead to the equilibrium payoffs E(v1(2)) and v2(θ2). We must remain
agnostic about what these strategies are since we have not specified the litigation
sub-game. In particular they may represent pure or mixed strategies. Moreover the
litigation sub-game could be a simultaneous or a sequential game played over one
or many periods with moves and countermoves. In this case σ1 and σ2(θ2) would
represent the entire equilibrium profile for each firm that specify the strategy and
beliefs conditional on each node of the litigation sub-game being reached.
Observation 4 The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
1. Firm 1 chooses to negotiate. If firm 2 chooses litigation (off-equilibrium) firm 1
chooses action σ1.
2. Firm 2 chooses to negotiate. If firm 1 chooses litigation (off-equilibrium) firm 2
chooses action σ2(θ2).
3. Firm 1’s posterior is equal to its prior when firm 2 chooses to negotiate or litigate.
This observation shows that given the existence of a surplus maximizing mechanism
we can construct an equilibrium where the firms choose to negotiate.15 As before, firm
1’s posterior being equal to its prior is consistent in equilibrium since firm 2 always
negotiates.
15 To be precise the existence of a surplus maximizing mechanism is sufficient but not necessary for
constructing such an equilibrium. We merely need that the reservation payoffs satisfy the condition in (20),
which guarantees the existence of at least one allocation that weakly dominates the reservation payoffs.
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4.5 Discussion
The negotiation equilibrium derived here relies on the assumption that the posterior
belief of firm 1 is equal to its prior in the event firm 2 chooses the off-equilibrium
action of triggering litigation. It is possible that the surplus maximizing mechanism
changes when this assumption is changed and that allocations that were previously
not implementable become implementable and vice versa. This assumption is made
to micro-found the idea that the reservation payoffs can arise as equilibrium payoffs
from a Bayesian game. However, deriving the surplus maximizing mechanism while
allowing the posterior of firm 1 to be affected by firm 2’s choice of triggering litigation
in a more general way is an interesting avenue for future work.
A firm chooses to negotiate only when it expects to receive an allocation that
weakly dominates its payoff from litigation. This is true as long as the firms expect
negotiations to yield a pareto dominating outcome relative to their reservation payoffs.
However in the real world there are situations where this may not be true. If for
example, the negotiations are constrained by a particular bargaining protocol, the
expected allocation from negotiation will be generally inferior to the one in the surplus
maximizing mechanism and may even be lower than the litigation payoff for at least
one of the two firms.
It is also possible that ex-post, once firm 2 declares its type, firm 1’s modified reser-
vation payoff (now foregone) is actually greater than its ex-post allocation under the
mechanism. Since the firms commit to forgoing the default game once they agree to
negotiate, the possibility of a change in the reservation payoffs induced by firm 2’s dec-
laration does not create any problems. However, if firms lacked the ability to commit,
this imposes additional constraints on the surplus maximizing mechanism possibly
leading to its non-existence.16 Hence, there is an important implicit assumption in this
framework – that negotiations between the firms as captured by the mechanism are
only constrained by IR constraints of the two firms and the IC of firm 2 and moreover
when a surplus maximizing allocation exists, then the firms expect it to be picked
when they choose to negotiate.
5 Conclusion
This paper embeds the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) model in a setting where
property rights are insecure. This insecurity allows for ex-post inefficiency under much
weaker conditions, in particular even when there is no uncertainty about which player
values the object more. This inefficiency arises when the reservation payoffs of the
players depend on the type of the informed player. This causes the reservation payoff
of the uninformed player to become unobservable to her. Consequently there are states
where the uninformed player overestimates her reservation payoff. I have shown that
even when the reservation payoffs involve some inefficiency, if this overestimation is
large enough, it is impossible to implement the first best. Taking type dependent reser-
vation payoffs as given, the paper characterizes the surplus maximizing mechanism
16 This issue is explored in Aney (2012).
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and the necessary and sufficient condition required for its existence. Finally, I show
an application of the model to a case of an intellectual property dispute between two
firms where type dependent reservation payoffs arise endogenously as a consequence
of property rights not being well defined.
This paper can be seen as an attempt to characterize a failure of the Coase theorem
in the environment where parties attempt to resolve their disputes efficiently when
their reservation payoffs are determined by conflict. The paper shows that even the
best alternatives to conflict may not deliver ex-post efficiency.
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Appendix
I now describe a procedure that will allow us to construct the set  for a given v2(θ2),
under the assumption that v2(θ2) is twice differentiable, and either concave or convex
on the interval [θ2, θ2].
1. Check if there exists a θ2 such that v′′2 (θ2) < 0. If yes, proceed to step 6. If no,
then proceed to step 2.
2. Construct a function η0(θ2) = v2(θ2) for all θ2. If η0(θ2) is non-decreasing, relabel
η0(θ2) as η3(θ2) and proceed to step 5. If not, proceed to step 3.
3. Since η0(θ2) is convex, the lowest point in [θ2, θ2] where η0(θ2) is decreasing
must be θ2. Set
η1(θ2) = η0(θ2) ∀θ2. (65)
Check if η1(θ2) ≥ η0(θ2). If yes, then relabel η1(θ2) as η3(θ2) and proceed to step
5. If no, then proceed to step 4.
4. Find the point a ∈ [θ2, θ2] such that η0(a) = η1(a) and η1(θ2) < η0(θ2) for all
θ2 ∈ (a, θ2] and set
η2(θ2) = η1(θ2) θ2 ≤ a
η2(θ2) = η0(θ2) θ2 > a (66)
Since η0(θ2) is convex, η2(θ2) must be convex and we must have η2(θ2) ≥ v2(θ2).
Proceed to step 5.
5. Using (19) check if η′2(θ2) ≤ 1. If yes, then relabel η2(θ2) as η(θ2) and the
procedure finishes. If no, then identify the highest point a such that a + η2(θ2) −
θ2 = η2(a). If no a ∈ [θ2, θ2] exists then construct the function η(θ2) such that
η(θ2) = θ2 + η2(θ2) − θ2θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2] (67)
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and the procedure ends. If a ∈ [θ2, θ2] does exist then set
η(θ2) = θ2 + η2(θ2) − θ2 θ2 ∈ [a, θ2]
η(θ2) = η2(θ2) θ2 < a. (68)
Now we must have η′(θ2) ≤ 1 for all θ2 and the procedure ends.
6. Construct a function η0(θ2) = v2(θ2) for all θ2. If η0(θ2) is non-decreasing, relabel
η0(θ2) as η1(θ2) and proceed to step 7. If η0(θ2) is non-increasing, set η(θ2) =
η0(θ2) for all θ2 and the procedure ends. If η0(θ2) increases and then decreases,
then find a ∈ [θ2, θ2] where η0(θ2) attains its maximum and set
η1(θ2) = η0(θ2) θ2 < a
η1(θ2) = η0(a) θ2 ≥ a. (69)
and proceed to step 7.
7. Check if η′1(θ2) ≤ 1. If yes, relabel η1(θ2) as η2(θ2) and proceed to step 8. If not,
identify the point a ∈ [θ2, θ2] such that η′1(a) = 1. Due to concavity of η1(θ2) we
must have η′1(θ2) > 1 for θ2 < a. Construct
η2(θ2) = θ2 + η1(a) − a θ2 < a
η2(θ2) = η1(θ2) θ2 ≥ a. (70)
Proceed to step 8.
8. For each point x ∈ [θ2, θ2] construct a function
η(θ2) = θ2η′2(x) + η2(x) − xη′2(x) (71)
and assign each η(θ2) to the set , and this procedure ends.
Proof of Proposition 1 When v2(θ2) is convex, steps 3 and 4 ensure that η(θ2) is
increasing, and step 5 ensures that 1 ≥ η′(θ2) ≥ 0. Note that in step 5 η′(θ2) < 1 for
θ2 > a is not possible since η(θ2) must be continuous and η′(θ2) < 1 for some θ2 > a
implies that we must also have η′(θ2) > 1 for some θ2 > a to satisfy the IR constraint
η(θ2) ≥ η2(θ2). Hence the lowest possible η(θ2) is defined by (67) and (68). We see
from step 5 that η(θ2) is unique when v2(θ2) is convex. When v2(θ2) is concave, step
6 ensures that η(θ2) is increasing and step 7, like step 5 in case of convex v2(θ2),
ensures that 1 ≥ η′(θ2) ≥ 0. In this case we have a set of functions  with elements
η(θ2) which may be denoted as η(θ2; x) that correspond to each point x ∈ [θ2, θ2].
I will now prove that  is compact. When v2(θ2) is convex, η(θ2) is unique, and
the set  is trivially compact. Consider the case when v2(θ2) is concave. In this case
 may be populated with a continuum of functions. Let ψ : [θ2, θ2] → , be defined
by ψ(x)(θ2) = η(θ2; x) for all x ∈ [θ2, θ2]. This function maps [θ2, θ2] onto  since
for all η ∈ , there exists an x ∈ [θ2, θ2] such that ψ(x) = η(·; x). To see this note
from step 8 that for each x ∈ [θ2, θ2], there exists an η(θ2; x) that is constructed as a
tangent to η2(θ2) at x .
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Hence as [θ2, θ2] is compact, if ψ(x) is continuous for all x ∈ [θ2, θ2], then 
which is the image of ψ is compact. By definition, ψ(x) is continuous at x ∈ [θ2, θ2]
if for any  > 0 there exists a δ such that ‖ψ(x)−ψ(y)‖ < ε for all y ∈ [θ2, θ2] such
that |x − y| < δ, where ‖·‖ is the uniform norm. Therefore, by the definitions of ψ
and η, we need to show that for any ε > 0, there exists a δ such that for all y ∈ [θ2, θ2]
such that |x − y| < δ,
‖ψ(x) − ψ(y)‖ = sup
θ2∈[θ2,θ2]
|η(θ2; x) − η(θ2; y)| (72)
= sup
θ2∈[θ2,θ2]
|θ2η′2(x) + η2(x)−xη′2(x)−θ2η′2(y)−η2(y) + yη′2(y)|
(73)
≤ |η2(x) − η2(y)| + θ2|η′2(x) − η′2(y)| + |xη′2(x) − yη′2(y)| < ε .
(74)
From step 8, we know that η2(θ2), η′2(θ2), and hence θ2η′2(θ2), are continuous
when v2(θ2) is twice differentiable and concave for all θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2]. Hence, for any
x ∈ [θ2, θ2] and any ε/3 > 0 we can find δ1, δ2, δ3 such that |η2(x)−η2(y)| < ε/3 for
all y ∈ [θ2, θ2] with |x − y| < δ1, θ2|η′2(x) − η′2(y)| < ε/3 for all y ∈ [θ2, θ2] with
|x − y| < δ2, and |xη′2(x)− yη′2(y)| < ε/3 for all y ∈ [θ2, θ2] with |x − y| < δ3. Let
δ := min(δ1, δ2, δ3). Then for any y ∈ [θ2, θ2] such that |x − y| < δ, the inequality
in (74) is satisfied, since each of the three terms in the sum is less than ε/3, showing
that ψ(x) is indeed continuous at any x ∈ [θ2, θ2]. unionsq
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